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2 March 1965  
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*Dan JES*

MEMORANDUM FOR: All Staff, Area, Division and Branch Chiefs  
SUBJECT : The Vietnam Crisis

The DCI, DDCI, and DDI have all variously expressed their concern that CIA make a maximum effort to support the national policy-makers during this critical period in Southeast Asia. Attached to this memorandum are some specific instructions issued by the DDI. I request each of you within his own area of responsibility to do everything possible to carry this out.



R. J. SMITH  
Assistant Director  
Current Intelligence

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## VIETNAM ACTION CHECKLIST

### I. Reporting and Analysis Targets

- A. Possibility of a concerted effort to cut off the northern provinces of South Vietnam by the Viet Cong, the DRV, and/or Communist China.
- B. Possibility of actions inimical to U.S. interests by South Vietnamese leaders, particularly General Thi.
- C. Approaches concerning negotiations on South Vietnam. There is high level interest in negative reporting on this subject as well.
- D. Possibility of Communist build-ups in other areas, such as Taiwan Strait, North Korea, Berlin.

### II. Internal Organization

- A. Intelligence information [redacted] is to be readily available to those who need it, and compartmentation (both within DDI and between DDI and DDP) broken down to the extent necessary to assure that all concerned have access to all available information.

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### III. Requirements

- A. Analysts and requirements officers are to review current requirements to make certain that they are pointed at our specific needs of the moment.

### IV. Assumptions and Estimates

- A. ONE is to review all its recent estimates on Vietnam and initiate any changes considered necessary.
- B. OCI is to review its production on the area and update as necessary.

### V. General

- A. All individuals and units concerned with the area are to review what we have done and are doing and satisfy themselves that we are in the best possible posture for meeting the Agency's responsibilities in the present critical period.